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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff / Petitioner, 
vs. 
TRACY SCOTT, 
Defendant / Respondent. 
Case No: 20170518-SC 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 Tracy Scott shot and killed his wife, Teresa. The only defense Tracy 
presented was that his guilt should be mitigated by the fact that he acted “under 
the influence of extreme emotional distress for which there is a reasonable 
explanation or excuse”, which was not “substantially caused by [his] own conduct.” 
UTAH CODE §76-5-205.5 (2013). In order to demonstrate this distress and its 
source, Tracy intended to testify that in the days preceding the shooting, his wife 
had threatened him. This threat would be used in conjunction with other evidence, 
like that Teresa repeatedly removed her gun from the gun safe and that their 
fighting had gotten worse than ever, with repeated confrontational behavior, to 
show Tracy experienced extreme distress caused by Teresa’s statements and 
conduct. As Tracy began to testify about that threat the prosecutor objected, 
alleging Teresa’s statements were hearsay. The correct response, the obvious 
response, was that the threat was not being offered to prove the truth of the matter 
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asserted, but to prove the effect the threat had upon Tracy, to prove how he 
received it, how it affected him. It was being offered to prove that Tracy’s distress 
was due, at least in part, to having been threatened by Teresa. Tracy continued to 
try to introduce the threat because it was the basis for his defense, but each time 
he did the prosecutor objected, defense counsel failed to respond, and the trial 
court excluded the testimony. Tracy was unable to present his defense, and counsel 
was unable to argue that threat contributed to Tracy’s distress, that the threat 
enhanced and amplified Teresa’s other conduct. On the other hand, the State was 
able to argue there was nothing Teresa did to cause Tracy’s distress. 
 This Court has allowed the State to challenge the Court of Appeals’ decision 
about whether it was deficient performance for counsel not to argue the threat 
evidence was not hearsay. Making that argument should be very difficult for the 
State. Reasonable counsel would not have failed to respond to the incorrect 
hearsay objection. The most basic question at issue in hearsay is ‘what is the 
purpose of the statement, why is it being offered?’ Any reasonable counsel would 
have known that the only relevant purpose to introduce Teresa’s threat was to 
prove the effect it had upon Tracy, and how it could have impacted his emotional 
distress. Any reasonable counsel would have known it wasn’t hearsay because it 
wasn’t being offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. To fail to utilize the 
basic rules of evidence was unreasonable and deficient. 
 This Court has also granted cert to consider the State’s argument that 
counsel’s failure to introduce the threat evidence didn’t prejudice Tracy’s case. But 
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again, this should be difficult fof the State. There can be little doubt that the threat 
evidence was central to Tracy’s defense. The only question is whether there is a 
reasonable likelihood that at least one juror would have found, by a 
preponderance, that Tracy’s extreme emotional distress was not substantially 
caused by his own conduct. Logic, as well as the record evidence, strongly suggests 
that at least one juror would have believed Tracy’s actions, while not justifiable, 
were mitigated by the totality of the circumstances, when the totality of the 
circumstances include that threat. Because this Court’s confidence in the verdict 
and the fairness of the trial should be undermined, trial counsel’s failure to respond 
to the hearsay objection was prejudicial. 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW  
1. Whether trial counsel’s failure to use basic evidentiary rules to admit 
a key piece of evidence for the defense constitutes deficient performance. 
2. Whether trial counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced the defense 
such that it undermines the Court’s confidence in the jury’s verdict.  
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 “On certiorari, this court reviews the decision of the court of appeals for 
correctness, giving no deference to its conclusions of law.” State v. Baker, 2010 UT 
18, ¶7, 229 P.3d 650. “An ineffective assistance of counsel claim raised for the first 
time on appeal presents a question of law.” State v. Ott, 2010 UT 1, ¶16, 247 P.3d 
344. 
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OPINION BELOW 
The Court of Appeals’ opinion to be reviewed is State v. Scott, 2017 UT App 
74, __ P.3d __.1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Summary of the Facts 
 Tracy and Teresa Scott began their marriage as “two peas in a pod.” 
R.278:84. Within a few years, however, the marriage became “good and bad” with 
instances of jealousy and fighting. R.278:86. According to Tracy, 65 to 70 percent 
of the time they were fighting. R.278:86–87. During their fighting, Scott insulted 
Teresa and used profanity. R.278:150. But, in terms of insults, threats, and 
profanity, Teresa could and would “pour it out” right back at him. R.278:168.  
 The couple’s fighting prompted police response some “six to eight time,” 
including one time in 2008 or 2009 when Scott was charged with domestic 
violence. R.278:88, 90. To deal with their fighting and confrontations, the couple 
started counseling with their local bishop and made attempts to improve the 
relationship. R.278:91. For a time, things improved. Id. Then, in 2006, police were 
called after the two began another fight that led to Tracy kicking Teresa. R.278:154.  
 At the time, Tracy was working for the Alpine School District as a school bus 
mechanic. R.278:93. Teresa attended college, trying to “get into something that she 
could comfortably do.” R.278:92. During this time, the two continued to fight 
                                                
1 A copy of the Court of Appeals’ decision is attached to this brief as Addendum A. 
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about finances, student loan debt, Teresa’s inability to find work, spending habits, 
how to use tax refunds, the need to repair the family’s vehicles, what assets could 
be sold to relive their financial burdens, and Teresa’s prescription drug costs. 
R.278:94–102. In the weeks preceding Teresa’s death, the couple’s fighting “was a 
lot, lot worse” than usual. R.278:107. It was “get in your face, yell, scream at each 
other, spit flying…” kind of fighting. R.278:107; 278:160.  
 Two or three days before the shooting, Tracy called his brother Zane on the 
phone. R.278:195. Tracy was “distraught,” “seemed worse,” and was “very 
disturbed.” R.278:196. Tracy’s voice was shaking on the phone and he “seemed 
over-concerned about what was going on.” Id.  
 On Friday, the day before the shooting, Tracy had the day off, so he went 
“out back” to “tinker in the garage or tinker in the yard.” R.278:108. When the 
phone rang in the garage, Tracy answered it. R.278:110. It was Teresa’s mother, so 
he took the phone into the couple’s bedroom where he saw Teresa “off to the front 
of the bed, sitting on a stool crouched down at the bed, in front of the bed crouched 
down.’ R.278:110–11. Tracy leaned across the corner of the bed, tossed the phone 
on the bed, and told Teresa it was her mother. R.278:112. As Tracy stood back up, 
he noticed that the couple’s gun safe was pulled out from under the dresser where 
it usually stayed, and was open. Id. He saw one pistol inside, but he did not see 
Teresa’s gun there, a Beretta 9-millimeter. R.278:116–17.  
 Walking back out to the garage, Tracy thought about the missing pistol and 
remembered “there was threat made” on Wednesday. R.278:112–13. Now, he 
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thought, “the threat was serious.” Id. Tracy believed Teresa was going to use the 
missing gun, the 9-millimeter Beretta, to do him some harm. R.278:117. Tracy was 
nervous, continued to stew and worry about it, and felt “scared to death.” Id.2 
 Tracy did not sleep well that night, and woke up feeling stressed and scared. 
R.278:121. Saturday morning Tracy went to a haircut appointment and then to 
work to put tires on the family’s car. R.278:121–22. Later that day, Tracy arranged 
to pick up some manure for the garden, but when he tried to back the trailer into 
the backyard, it “kept rubbing the fence.” R.278:125. That caused “another 
argument” in front of the children. Id. Their oldest son, Thayne, remembered the 
fighting that day “was more aggressive than regular fights.” R.279:98. It was more 
contentious than normal. R.278:103.  
 When Tracy went into the house to use the bathroom, he saw “the [gun] safe 
was pulled out from… underneath the dresser—open with one pistol in it.” 
R.278:126–27. Earlier, Tracy had seen the safe “closed and shoved back under the 
dresser,” but now it was open again, and the Beretta was missing. R.278:163. Like 
the day before, Teresa was sitting next to the bed. R.278:127. Having seen the gun 
taken from the safe again, Tracy decided that using the bathroom inside the home 
was the “last of [his] problems,” so he went outside and “went to the bathroom in 
a ditch out back in the corner.” Id. He did not “dare go back in the house,” and 
                                                
2 Trial counsel asked, “who threatened who?”, but before Tracy could answer, the 
prosecutor objected again and Tracy did not testify who had threatened him. 
R.278:113. 
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instead, stayed out in the garage. Id.  
 Several times, while Tracy was in the garage, he noticed “Teresa would be 
leaning out the door and just staring at [him] and so [he] just was freaking out.” 
R.278:128. Scared to death because he thought she had a gun, Tracy “started to wig 
out, just freak out.” R.278:129. Eventually, he decided he was “going to go in there 
and confront this.” Id. When he entered the house, he could hear Teresa on the 
phone and thought she was talking to her mother. R.278:130. Tracy went into the 
kitchen and took a drink from out of the refrigerator. R.278:131. Then, he heard 
Teresa’s voice yelling at him. Id.  
 At that moment, Tracy “snapped,” “saw red,” and “went storming in there.” 
Id. Teresa was laying on the bed, point her cell phone at Tracy, as if she was taking 
a picture or video of him. R.278:164. Tracy “looked at her…looked at the cell…[and] 
looked down at the gun safe.” R.278:131. The “only gun there was the black one,” 
the Beretta was missing again. Id.  
 Tracy “reached down and grabbed the gun” and cocked it on the way up. Id. 
He stood there “with the gun in [his] hand pointed at Teresa.” He noticed his hand 
was shaking, “[a]nd then, boom.” Id. Tracy stared at Teresa, but she just sat there 
not moving. Id. Then, Tracy started walking away when “all of the sudden she just 
started to lean and was dead.” Id. Tracy jumped, and the gun went off again. 
R.278:132. Cautiously, Tracy walked around the end of the bed to the other side 
and looked down. Id. There, “right off the side” of the bed on the carpet, was the 9-
millimeter Beretta, fully loaded with a round in the chamber. R.278:163; 277:120.  
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B. Summary of the Proceedings 
 Several times during his testimony, defense counsel asked questions related 
to the circumstances of a particular threat Teresa made to Tracy. The prosecutor 
objected to this testimony, arguing that it would be hearsay. R.278:98, 110, 113. 
The trial court called a sidebar and told defense counsel, “There’s no way that 
you’re going to dance around and get a threat without [it] being hearsay. The only 
two people in the room is this, so get away from this….” R.291:113.  
 Following the sidebar, defense counsel resumed questioning Tracy. Again, 
defense counsel asked a question related to the details of the threat made to Tracy. 
Id. The prosecutor objected again, and the court called another sidebar. The court 
warned defense counsel, “if we get a feel within one question, I’m just going to 
make you move onto a new line of testimony…” Id. Defense counsel never argued, 
at either sidebar, that the testimony he sought to introduce was not hearsay, and 
thus admissible. R.278:113–14. In fact, defense counsel never really responded at 
all to the claim that Teresa’s statements were hearsay. The specific words of the 
threat were never introduced or proffered during trial, and subsequently, are not 
part of this record on appeal.3 
 During deliberation, the jury sent several written communications to the 
court. One note characterized the jurors as “at an absolute impasse. 6-2.” R.182; 
                                                
3 Scott filed a 23B motion to remand to the Utah Court of Appeals with attachments 
demonstrating what the content of the threat was. The Court of Appeals did not 
rule on that motion. A copy of that motion, with its attachments, is attached to this 
brief as Addendum B. 
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280:78. The note then stated, “Two feel that ‘substantially caused’ needs to be the 
‘majority of the time’ See 13b.” Id. Referring to the requirements of special 
mitigation, the jury sent another note asking, “What is the legal definition of 
‘substantially caused?’” R.181, see Utah Code §76-5-205.5(3)(b).4 
 The court declined to define the term “substantially caused” and concluded 
that the instructions already given were proper. R.280:85–86. It found no 
difference “between an impasse and an absolute impasse.” R.280:86. According to 
the court, “absolutely” only meant that the jury had “really tried.” Id. The court 
then issued an Allen-type dynamite instruction, over defense counsel’s objection 
and request for mistrial, urging the jury to continue deliberations “in an effort to 
agree upon a verdict.” R.180; 280:94.5 
 After having receive the dynamite instruction, the jury continued 
deliberations “from 6:06 to 8:19,” or another two hours and 13 minutes. R.280:95. 
After deliberations, it returned a verdict of guilty of murder and did not find special 
mitigation under the influence of extreme emotional distress. R.179; 280:96. The 
court sentenced Tracy to serve 15 years to life in prison. R.236; 182:12–13.  
 Scott filed a timely notice of appeal. R.238. The Court of Appeals issued its 
                                                
4 Although the record is not precisely clear when these two notes were sent from 
the jury, and whether they were sent at the same time, the context of the record 
makes clear that the court and the parties understood the jury’s impasse was tied 
to the question of special mitigation and about the meaning of “substantially 
caused.” The jury questions (R.181-82) are attached to this brief as Addendum C. 
5 A copy of the trial court’s supplemental instruction (R.180) is attached to this 
brief as Addendum D. 
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opinion reversing Scott’s conviction and ordering a new trial on May 4, 2017. 
C. Decision of the Court of Appeals  
 On appeal, Scott raised two issues: 1) Whether the trial court erred in giving 
a verdict-urging instruction when the jury was at an absolute impasse; and 2) 
Whether trial counsel provided effective assistance. The Court of Appeals 
addressed only the second issue in its opinion. Scott also filed a motion for remand 
pursuant to Rule 23B to produce evidence of ineffectiveness, including the content 
of the threat evidence. The Court of Appeals did not rule on that motion. 
 In support of his claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, Scott argued that 
when the State objected to testimony regarding Teresa’s threat, defense counsel 
did not attempt to argue the threat was admissible non-hearsay. State v. Scott, 
2017 UT App 74, ¶19, ___ P.3d ___. The State, defense, and Court of Appeals all 
agreed that the threat was not hearsay and should have been admitted. Scott, ¶22. 
“[I]f defense counsel had demonstrated this through proper argument,” the Court 
of Appeals wrote, “the [trial] court would have allowed Scott to testify about it.” Id. 
at 23. “[D]efense counsel failed to correctly use the rules of evidence to support 
Scott’s defense”. Id. at ¶25. This failure, the Court concluded, “was unreasonable, 
especially in light of Scott’s trial strategy, which was to show that his distress 
originated outside his own behavior… a reasonable attorney would have used the 
rules of evidence to explain to the court why the threat was admissible.” Id. at ¶25. 
The court concluded that counsel’s failure to utilize the rules of evidence “did not 
merely ‘deviate from best practices or most common custom’—it amounted to 
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deficient performance.” Id. (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 105 
(2011)). 
 The State claimed counsel’s performance “was not deficient because ‘counsel 
had a sound strategic reason not to seek to admit the specific words of Teresa’s 
alleged threat.’” Id. at ¶26. According to the State, “an ‘imaginary threat’ could have 
had a greater impact on the jury than hearing the actual words.” Id. at ¶26. The 
Court of Appeals quickly dismissed this argument: “the negative repercussions of 
omitting the content of the threat were greater than the possible benefits; 
admitting its contents would only have strengthened Scott’s defense.” Id. at ¶27. 
The court characterized the threat as “central to a defense that focused on trying 
to show that Scott’s conduct originated from distress caused by a source other than 
his own conduct, there was no strategic reason for counsel not to argue that the 
threat was admissible.” Id. at ¶28. Ultimately, the court determined that Scott had 
med his burden showing his defense counsel’s performance was deficient. Id.  
 The Court of Appeals then turned its attention to the question of whether 
defense counsel’s deficient performance caused prejudice. While the State 
maintained “there [was] no reasonable likelihood the outcome of the trial would 
have been different if the jury had heard the specific words of Teresa’s threat,” the 
Court of Appeals found otherwise. Id. at ¶32.  
 Scott testified that “there was a threat made,” and had even pointed to the 
fact that Teresa’s gun missing from its safe made him think “the threat was 
serious.” Id. at ¶33. However, when Scott tried to explain the details of the threat, 
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tried to explain why the threat was connected to the missing gun, the State 
objected, the Court sustained the objection, and defense counsel did not “inquire 
into it again and did not argue, or even imply, that the threat played a role in special 
mitigation.” Id. At closing argument, the Court of Appeals found that the 
prosecution asked the jury “what reasonable basis does [Scott] have to make [the] 
claim that simply the absence of that gun from the safe creates extreme emotional 
distress[?].” Id. (alteration in original). “For these reasons,” the Court ruled, “we 
are persuaded that testimony of the specific threat and its effect on Scott would 
have given the jury more evidence on the very point that was in dispute.” Id. That 
probability was enough to undermine the Court’s confidence in the outcome of the 
trial. Id. At ¶34. The Court of Appeals then concluded that Scott had received 
ineffective assistance of counsel and ordered his conviction reversed and 
remanded for a new trial. Id. at ¶35.  
 Judge Voros and Judge Christiansen wrote concurring opinions, in which 
both acknowledged that “Scott was the usual aggressor” in the relationship. Id. at 
¶37, ¶46. Considering the lengthy accounts of arguments, fights, domestic violence 
reports, and even a temporary restraining order, both Judge Voros and Judge 
Christiansen questions whether Scott should have had access to the extreme 
emotional distress defense, questioned whether the law should not be changed. Id. 
at ¶39–40, ¶44. Yet, both judges also agreed that the threatening statement made 
to Scott “fell outside the definition of hearsay” and “Competent defense counsel 
should have known enough to correctly argue that the rules of evidence would 
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allow the jury to hear this testimony.” Id. at ¶43, ¶36. Both judges joined in the 
opinion finding counsel’s error in responding to the hearsay objection prejudiced 
Scott’s defense. 
 On July 5, 2017, the State filed its Petition for a Writ of Certiorari. Scott filed 
his Response on August 3, 2017. A reply from the State was filed on August 22, 
2017. This Court granted the State’s Petition for a Writ of Certiorari on September 
20, 2017.  
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
 The Court of Appeals found trial counsel’s performance deficient because he 
failed to use the rules of evidence to admit the most crucial piece of evidence for 
the defense. In an attempt to undermine that decision the State tries to reframe 
the question, and rather than focusing on the actual issue (the hearsay objection 
and counsel’s failure to respond) the State tries to imagine a different case where 
the defense does not intend to admit the threat evidence. The State wants this 
Court to focus on this imaginary case and the conceivable strategies that could play 
a role there. But this Court should not follow the State’s lead. Because the defense 
in this case was trying to admit evidence that was admissible non-hearsay, it was 
objectively unreasonable, and certainly not strategic, for trial counsel not to 
respond to the objection. Trial counsel should have known what evidentiary 
argument to make to overcome the State’s objection. Instead, counsel failed to 
make any argument in support of admitting the evidence. Such conduct is 
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objectively unreasonable and, under Strickland’s test, constitutes deficient 
performance.  
 By performing in a way no other competent attorney would have performed, 
the jury found that Scott substantially caused his extreme emotional distress. 
However, had trial counsel used the rules of evidence to admit the defense’s key 
piece of evidence, the jury would have learned that Teresa had been a major source 
of Tracy’s distress. The State disagrees with this analysis, arguing the threat played 
only a minor role in the defense. Considering the jury had already reached an 
absolute impasse during initial deliberations, though, the State’s argument 
underestimates how necessary testimony of the threat was to the defense. With it, 
the jury likely would have remained at an impasse, or more jurors would have 
believed Tracy did not substantially cause his own distress. Therefore, but for 
defense counsel’s deficient performance, there is a reasonable probability that the 
trial’s outcome would have been different. For these reasons, Scott respectfully 
asks this Court to affirm the Court of Appeals’ opinion.  
ARGUMENT 
I. FOLLOWING THE STANDARD SET FORTH IN STRICKLAND v. 
WASHINGTON, THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY FOUND 
TRIAL COUNSEL’S PERFORMANCE DEFICIENT 
 
 This Court has “classified the burden that defendants bear when asserting 
an ineffective assistance of counsel claim as a ‘heavy’ one.” State v. Larrabee, 2013 
UT 70, ¶18, 321 P.3d 1136. That is because a defendant must prove both of the 
following: 1) that counsel’s performance was so deficient as to fall below an 
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objective standard of reasonableness and 2) that but for counsel’s deficient 
performance there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would 
have been different. Id. (citing State v. Nelson–Waggoner, 2004 UT 29, ¶29, 94 
P.3d 186). Yet, the Sixth Amendment recognizes defense counsel’s role to “ensure 
that the trial is fair.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685 (1984). “For 
that reason, the Court has recognized that the right to counsel is the right to 
effective assistance of counsel.” Id. at 686 (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 
U.S. 759, 771 n. 14, 90 S.Ct. 1441, 25 L.Ed.2d 763 (1970)). “The benchmark for 
judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel’s conduct so 
undermined the proper function of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be 
relied on as having produced a just result.” Id.  
 This Court granted the State’s Writ of Certiorari to determine whether 
Scott’s trial counsel’s failure with respect to the erroneous hearsay objection fell 
below the objectively reasonable standard set forth in Strickland. The State’s brief 
goes to great lengths to argue that the Court of Appeals failed to use Strickland’s 
standard in analyzing defense counsel’s performance. As an initial, procedural 
matter, Scott asserts that this Court limited the issues on appeal to arguments over 
whether the Court of Appeals correctly applied the Strickland standard, not 
whether it used the appropriate standard. 
 The Court of Appeal’s opinion unequivocally found defense counsel’s 
performance objectively unreasonable, based on Strickland’s requirements. 
Specifically, the court found that defense counsel had failed to make a basic 
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evidentiary argument to overcome a hearsay objection. In turn, this failure 
prevented counsel from admitting a key piece of evidence necessary for Scott’s 
mitigating defense of extreme emotional distress. That evidence was a threat, made 
by Scott’s wife Teresa, to Scott. Failure to “correctly use the rules of evidence” to 
admit this testimony, the court concluded, constituted performance below an 
objective standard of reasonableness. Scott, ¶25. 
 Despite this conclusion, the State argues that because the record did not 
include the details of Teresa’s threat, the Court of Appeals could not reach the 
conclusion that counsel performed deficiently. For purposes of the Strickland 
deficiency prong, however, the State places more weight than necessary on the 
content of the threat. As admissible, non-hearsay testimony, counsel should have 
easily overcome the State’s hearsay objection at trial and admitted this crucial 
piece of evidence. Although the State argues that because the content of the threat 
is not in the record Scott cannot prove deficiency, the State confuses deficiency for 
prejudice. 
A. The Supreme Court’s Restatement of the Issues in this Appeal 
Do Not Give Leave for Arguments Over the Standard Used in the 
Lower Court’s Opinion  
 
 The Court granted the Petition for Writ of Certiorari and used the following 
language to restate the issues on appeal: “1. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in 
concluding Respondent’s trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to 
argue testimony about a threat was not hearsay. 2. Whether the Court of Appeals 
erred in concluding Respondent was prejudiced by counsel’s failure to assert that 
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testimony about a threat was not hearsay.” See Order Granting State’s Petition for 
Writ of Certiorari. The Court’s restatement of these issues indicates its intent to 
hear arguments about the correctness of the lower court’s conclusions, not whether 
the Court of Appeals applied the wrong standard in making those conclusions. 
More specifically, the Court’s issue restatement invites arguments on the 
ineffectiveness claim within the context of the hearsay issue and counsel’s failure 
to overcome the hearsay. Indeed, the Court’s language seems to discourage 
arguments about whether the contested evidence conforms to a particular trial 
theory. Had the Court wished to consider the lower courts construction and 
application of the standard for ineffective assistance of counsel, its restatement of 
the issues would more clearly represent its desire to do so.  
 Instead, the Court expressly limited the parties’ arguments to whether the 
lower court reached the correct conclusion about the hearsay issue. Nonetheless, 
the State argued in its brief that the Court of Appeals misconstrued the Strickland 
standard in its analysis. See Brief of Petitioner (hereinafter “Pet. Bf.”), pgs. 27, 33, 
36, & 38. “The court of appeals began and ended its deficient performance analysis 
with assessing whether counsel had a sound trial strategy.” Id. at 27. This analysis, 
the State criticized, was incorrect. Id.  
 The State’s criticism is misplaced and entirely overlooks the lower court’s 
discussion of Strickland’s standard, the “objective standard of reasonableness.” 
Strickland, 446 U.S. at 688. Indeed, the court, from the outset of its opinion, noted, 
“To show deficient performance under Strickland, Scott must demonstrate that 
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counsel’s performance ‘fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.’” Scott, 
2017 UT 74, ¶20 (quoting Strickland, 446 U.S. at 688). The court continued its 
discussion of the “objective standard of reasonableness” when it analyzed defense 
counsel’s inability to correctly argue the rules of evidence, comparing counsel’s 
failure to what a “reasonable attorney” would have done in light of Scott’s trial 
strategy. Id. at ¶25. Such an attorney “would have used the rules of evidence to 
explain to the court why [Teresa’s threat] was admissible.” Id. “Counsel’s lack of 
argument,” the Court of Appeals concluded, “did not merely ‘deviate[] from best 
practices or most common custom—it amounted to deficient performance.” Id. 
(quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 105 (2011)).  
 The State believes the court rested its conclusion solely upon a 
determination that counsel’s actions did not constitute “sound trial strategy.” Pet. 
Bf., pg. 27. Yet, the State fails to acknowledge that the lower court’s discussion of 
trial strategy was merely a response to the State’s argument that “counsel had a 
sound strategic reason not to seek to admit the specific words of Teresa’s alleged 
threat.” Scott, ¶26. Quickly disposing with that argument, the court found that “the 
threat’s actual content could have connected it to various aspects of Scott’s 
testimony…and would have established the foundation for testimony about Scott’s 
reaction to seeing the empty gun safe.” Id. at ¶27. Thus, according to the court, 
choosing not to admit the threat “could not have been sound trial strategy.” Id. By 
removing the actual wording of the court’s opinion, and by taking portions of that 
opinion out of context, the State seeks for this Court to clarify that the correct 
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standard for ineffective assistance of counsel is whether an attorney’s performance 
was objectively unreasonable. Because the Court of Appeals conducted that exact 
analysis, albeit not to the State’s preferred outcome, there is no reason to suspect 
the court erred in either its construction or application of the Strickland standard. 
This Court should not entertain the State’s attempt to redraw the lines for 
Strickland ineffectiveness because the Court of Appeals’ opinion clearly follows the 
standards set forth there and followed by Utah Courts for decades.  
B. Using the Strickland Standard, the Court of Appeals Correctly 
Found Trial Counsel’s Performance Deficient  
 
It is uncontested that the threat Teresa made should have been admitted at 
trial as non-hearsay statements crucial to establishing Scott’s state of mind at the 
time of the shooting. Despite this fact, the State maintains that defense counsel 
pursued a reasonable, strategic decision to not admit evidence that ought to have 
been admitted. It reasons that the evidence was unnecessary, given the volume of 
other evidence in the larger evidentiary picture. As such, the State believes there 
was no strategic value in attempting to admit the threat. It concludes that this trial 
strategy, abandoning the threat and using the other available evidence at trial to 
prove Scott’s extreme emotional distress defense, precludes a finding that defense 
counsel performed deficiently. The State’s arguments, however fail for the 
following reasons. First, because the evidence was admissible non-hearsay, there 
was no reasonable, strategic decision not to admit the evidence. Second, because 
the evidence should have been admitted, defense counsel should have known what 
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evidentiary argument to make to admit the evidence. Third, by failing to make any 
evidentiary argument in support of admitting the evidence at all, defense counsel 
performed in a way no other competent attorney would have done.  
1. There was no strategic reason to not admit Teresa’s threat  
It is well-established that in reviewing a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel, courts must “judge the reasonableness of counsel’s challenged conduct on 
the facts of the particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel’s conduct.” 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. However, the Strickland standard reinforces the 
strong presumption that, “under the circumstances, the challenged action might 
be considered sound trial strategy.” Benvenuto v. State, 2007 UT 53, ¶19, 165 P.3d 
1195 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). Therefore, to satisfy Strickland’s first 
prong, a “defendant must overcome the strong presumption that [his] trial counsel 
rendered adequate assistance…by persuading the court that there was no 
conceivable tactical basis for counsel’s actions.” State v. Clark, 2004 UT 25, ¶6, 89 
P.3d 162 (quoting Bryant, 965 P.2d 539, 542 (1998); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). “[T]o rebut the presumption of sound 
strategy, a defendant must ‘persaud[e] the court that there was no conceivable 
tactical basis for counsel’s actions.’” Id. 
The State has never admitted that trial counsel erred by not offering any 
argument to support the admission of Teresa’s threat. Instead, the State asserts 
that defense counsel’s actions “appear designed to further a reasonable trial 
strategy….” Pet. Bf., pg. 30. When counsel drew an objection to testimony about 
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Teresa’s threat during trial, the State assumes counsel had acted under the belief 
that “reasonably concluded he need not respond to the prosecutor’s hearsay 
objection by arguing that the words were nonhearsay.” Id. at 36–37. In other 
words, according to the State, it was objectively reasonable for defense counsel to 
immediately abandon his perfectly legitimate line of questioning that could have 
continued with Tracy’s testimony detailing Teresa’s threat when the State 
erroneously objected because counsel could have believed the testimony wasn’t 
“necessary”. It is as if the State believes, because there was other evidence of 
Tracy’s distress, even though the threat testimony was admissible and Tracy was 
there ready to present it, because counsel would have had to actually respond to 
the objection by saying “it’s not hearsay” it was objectively reasonable to simply 
give up and limit the defense to the other evidence of distress. 
The State supports this contention for two reasons: 1) “Defense counsel 
could have reasonably concluded… he was not likely to succeed in getting the words 
of the threat admitted”; and 2) “a reasonable attorney could conclude that he 
already had more than enough to add the threat piece to the larger extreme 
emotional disturbance puzzle.” Id. at 37. These arguments to the Court suggest, as 
it did to the Court of Appeals below, that defense counsel, either before or during 
trial, decided he did not want the contents of the threat admitted. Even if that were 
the case, though the record strongly suggests otherwise, deciding not to admit this 
threat would itself constitute objectively unreasonable performance. No 
competent attorney would decide not to admit the defense’s most crucial piece of 
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evidence. It seems, then, that the State’s understanding of counsel’s trial strategy 
is at odds with the facts of this case.  
This is not a case where, after the fact, the defendant points to some evidence 
that was never discussed at trial and blames his attorney for not presenting it, but 
that is the way the State wants the Court to think of it. Instead, this is a case where 
the evidence was gathered, it was prepared, it was loaded and ready to admit. It 
was on the tip of the witness’s tongue. The record is clear that defense counsel 
made not one, but two attempts to get Teresa’s threat in. R.278:113–14. There can 
be no doubt, defense counsel was attempting to admit the evidence, contrary to the 
State’s belief. How then can the State argue it is possible “to conceive of a 
reasonable tactical basis for trial counsel’s actions” when the facts so blatantly 
contradict the State’s belief? Pet. Bf., pg. 29.  
Perhaps the State believes that, prior to trial, defense counsel determined 
“he was not likely to succeed in getting the words of the threat admitted,” but 
nonetheless, endeavored to try anyway. Id. Under this theory, defense counsel 
would have acted under a pre-determined assumption that the evidence would be 
inadmissible, but perhaps the State would not object. If that were true, though the 
record seems to contradict this scenario, counsel’s performance would still be 
deficient, not because of any strategic decision, but because counsel’s actions 
plainly illustrate his lack of basic evidentiary knowledge, because the evidence 
plainly was admissible. A pre-trial determination that a non-hearsay threat was 
actually inadmissible evidence, would be construed as deficient performance, 
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simply because no competent attorney would reach the conclusion the State 
suggests defense counsel may have reached.    
Or perhaps the State is suggesting that, prior to trial, counsel knew the threat 
evidence was admissible but decided he did not actually want to admit the threat, 
only to have the jury see him try to admit it and fail. Under this scenario counsel 
would have had to correctly predict both that counsel for the State would 
incorrectly object to the threat evidence, and the trial court would incorrectly 
exclude it. To be correct about that set of errors borders on prophetic, and in 
reality, is not reasonable strategic purpose. 
Another possible scenario, the one appellate counsel believes the State most 
likely endorses, is that counsel intended to introduce the hearsay evidence but, 
after the warning from the judge, decided not to continue attempting to admit it. 
See Pet. Br., pg. 37. In this scenario, it is unclear whether counsel knows the rules 
on hearsay, but assuming he does, his actions seem very strange. The State 
characterizes counsel’s decision not to continue seeking to admit the threat 
evidence as reasonable following the “judge’s strong admonition against inquiring 
into the specific words of the threat”. Pet. Br., pg. 37. But what about the first time 
the objection was raised? What about prior to the strong admonition? What about, 
immediately following the first hearsay objection? Why wouldn’t counsel properly 
respond then? Under this scenario, reasonable counsel would correctly respond to 
the hearsay objection. 
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 On this point, the State’s case fails. The underlying question here is not, as 
the State contends, about why some other attorney might conclude it was 
reasonable trial strategy to not admit the evidence. Rather, the question is whether 
counsel’s failure to respond to a hearsay objection was objectively reasonable. As 
explained above, there was “no conceivable tactical basis for counsel’s actions.” 
Clark, at ¶6. To conclude otherwise would be illogical under the facts presented in 
this appeal and simplicity of the solution. But, counsel’s performance was not only 
deficient for strategic reasons; counsel did what no other competent attorney 
would have done, counsel failed to make any argument over the prosecutor’s 
erroneous objection, even where the rules of evidence provide a perfectly suited 
response... this was not hearsay because it was not offered to prove the truth of the 
matter asserted. See UT.R.EVID. 801(c). No reasonable attorney would fail to use 
the rules of evidence to admit this testimony. 
2. Defense counsel should have overcome the hearsay objection  
Since Teresa’s threat was admissible, it follows that defense counsel should 
have overcome the prosecutor’s hearsay objection by making a simple evidentiary 
argument. The State insists there is a reasonable alternative for defense counsel’s 
actual actions. And reviewing courts should affirmatively entertain the range of 
possible ‘reasons [defense] counsel may have had for proceeding as they did.” 
Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 196 (2011). But, the threshold question under 
Strickland “is whether a reasonable, competent attorney could have chosen the 
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strategy that was employed in the real-time context of trial.” State v. Barela, 2015 
UT 22, ¶21, 349 P.3d 676 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689).  
From the State’s perspective, the Court of Appeals was wrong because it did 
not force Scott to prove that no reasonable attorney would have stayed silent when 
the State incorrectly made the hearsay objection. Instead, according to the State, 
the Court of Appeals found counsel deficient merely because it found “counsel 
could have successfully made an argument” and didn’t. Pet. Br., pg. 40. The State 
wants this Court to consider the wide range of options that were open to counsel 
when the hearsay objection came in, and claims that there were other legitimate, 
reasonable, responses, including doing nothing. Id., at 40-41. The State believes 
the Court of Appeals’ decision was too hasty because it did not consider that 
counsel was “permitted to choose a strategy within the wide ‘range of legitimate 
decisions regarding how best to represent a criminal defendant.’” Id., at 41 
(quoting State v. Met, 2016 UT 51, ¶113). 
What is odd about the State’s argument is that while it presumes there was 
this wide range of reasonable options available to counsel when the objection came 
in, the State does not actually present any conceivable reasonable alternatives. The 
State simply criticizes the Court of Appeals and asks this Court to reverse because 
the court below did not consider whether it was reasonable to “conclude[] that 
getting the specific wording of Teresa’s threat was not so necessary to the defense 
that it was worth pressing the issue further.” Pet. Br., pg. 37 (emphasis added). 
This proposed strategy, to not respond to the objection for fear that it would upset 
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the trial judge, is new (the State only argued the objection was omitted because 
counsel “concluded that he was better off without the specific wording of Teresa’s 
threat” its brief to the Court of Appeals, page 33-34). But there can be little doubt 
that, had it been presented as a conceivable strategy, it would have been rejected 
as well. Nothing about the record suggests Judge Mortenson was not permitting 
responses to objections, or that if counsel had asserted the evidence was not 
hearsay that the court would have held it against Scott or taken revenge in some 
way. One cannot reasonably argue that properly responding to the hearsay 
objection in this context would have been met with anger or retribution from the 
judge. And because counsel could not have reasonably feared it would, no 
reasonable attorney would find failing to respond would be a reasonable strategic 
response. 
The Court of Appeals did entertain the State’s purported strategic reason for 
not responding to the hearsay objection below and found the proposed strategy did 
not constitute sound trial strategy. Scott, ¶¶25–27. The State argued that an 
“‘imaginary threat’ could have had a greater impact on the jury than hearing the 
actual words.” Scott, ¶26. In order to respond to this proposal, first, the Court of 
Appeals looked at the case in context, which was that the defense strategy was to 
“show that [Tracy’s] distress originated outside his own behavior.” Id. at ¶25. Scott, 
who had the constitutional right to testify, to tell his side of the story, was there on 
the witness stand trying to explain why he was so worried about that gun. Counsel’s 
failure to respond to the erroneous objection occurred in this context. This Court 
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should start with the same context in mind. The Court of Appeals related the threat 
evidence to the rest of the evidence presented, “including Teresa’s threatening 
behavior in other contexts”, as well as counsel’s failure to refer to an imaginary 
threat in closing. Id. at ¶27. If counsel had wanted the jury to conjure up something 
worse and connect that imaginary threat to Tracy’s distress, counsel would have at 
least mentioned it in closing, but he didn’t. Instead, counsel steered clear of the 
threat entirely after the judge ruled it was inadmissible hearsay. 
For example, on Friday, the day before the shooting, Scott testified that he 
first noticed Teresa’s gun was missing from the couple’s safe. R.278:112. This 
caused him to think back to the Wednesday before, when he and Teresa had been 
in a “big fight,” Teresa had accused Scott of having an affair, and a threat had been 
made. R.278:113. But before he could testify about the details of the threat, the 
prosecutor objected on hearsay grounds. R.278:113. After a brief sidebar, defense 
counsel again inquired into Scott’s thoughts about the missing gun, to which Scott 
replied, “I was thinking that the threat that I had received the day before…That she 
was going to—she was,” and another objection was raised. R.278:113–114. The 
hearsay objection was not responded to and was sustained, so the questioning 
moved on. R.278:114. Defense counsel then asked Scott, “were you worried that 
Teresa was going to use that gun to do some harm to you?” R.278:117. Scott 
responded, “Yes.” Id.  
Then, on the day of the shooting, Scott testified that while working in the 
garage he decided to go inside to use the bathroom. R.278:126. Once inside, he saw 
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Teresa in the corner of their bedroom, and noticed Teresa’s gun missing from the 
safe again. R.278:127. Scott panicked, and refused to stay inside any longer. 
R.278.:127). He went back to the garage and moments later noticed Teresa leaning 
out the door, “just staring at [him]….” R.278:128. Scott contemplated calling the 
cops, but decided not to when Teresa went back inside. R.278:128. Scott went back 
to work, but a few moments later Teresa came back into the garage and began 
staring at him again before going back into the house. R.278:129. Scott testified 
that he “was scared to death” during this episode, and when he heard Teresa yelling 
at him from inside, he “snapped.” R.278:131. Scott “went storming” into the 
bedroom, saw Teresa on the bed, and looked down to see her gun was still missing 
from the safe. R.278:131. That is when Scott reached down, grabbed his own gun 
out of the safe, and shot Teresa. R.278:131. 
In light of this testimony, defense counsel could not conclude that “sound 
trial strategy” excused his failure to present any arguments in favor of admitting 
the contents of Teresa’s threat. Sound trial strategy could not be to hope the jury 
would remember the fact that Tracy had testified there had been a threat and never 
mention it again. The threat testimony was the linchpin of the defense, it was 
crucial to understand how the threat connected to the rest of Tracy’s testimony, 
and because this evidence was perfectly admissible, counsel should have overcome 
the hearsay objection.  
Nonetheless, the State contends, “Merely because counsel could have 
successfully made an argument, and that doing so may have supported the 
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defendant’s defense, is never enough to prove deficient performance under 
Strickland.” Pet. Bf., pg. 40.  
While there is some truth to this contention, since this Court has not 
interpreted Strickland’s test to permit a per se deficient performance, Scott is not 
seeking a finding of per se deficiency here. See Kell v. State, 2008 UT 62, ¶31, 194 
P.3d 913 (refusing to make a per se deficient finding for counsel’s failure to 
challenge five jurors for cause, or object to the prosecutor’s opening statement); 
but see United State v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984) 
(recognizing some circumstances where ineffective assistance of counsel is 
presumed: 1) complete denial of counsel; 2) defense counsel fails to subject the 
State’s case to any “meaningful adversarial testing”; and 3) when it is unlikely that 
any attorney could prove effective assistance under the circumstances). Instead, 
Scott asks the Court to do just as the Court of Appeals has done, to find that, under 
the circumstances, counsel’s failure to respond to the objection was unreasonable. 
No attorney is perfect, and Strickland does not require flawless 
representation. But Strickland does require counsel to perform objectively 
reasonably. And when no other competent attorney would fail to make a basic 
evidentiary argument to introduce clearly admissible evidence, evidence the 
defense clearly intends to introduce, it cannot be said that such action is objectively 
reasonable. Despite the State’s claim that “[t]here are countless ways to provide 
effective assistance in any given case,” (See Pet. Br., pg. 41 (quoting Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 689) in this case there was only one way to present the defense counsel 
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sought to raise, extreme emotional distress caused by Teresa’s conduct, and 
counsel failed to make the one simple evidentiary argument necessary to present 
that defense.  
A similar situation arose in State v. Millett, where a defendant sought post-
conviction relief by claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. 2015 UT App 187, 
¶7, 356 P.3d 700. There, the defendant asserted that he did not receive proper 
Miranda warnings before an interrogation by police and defense counsel failed to 
exclude his involuntary confession on that basis. Id. at ¶8. The Court of Appeals 
agreed, finding defense counsel’s actions “outside the wide range of professionally 
competent assistance.” Id. at ¶18. Nonetheless, the State presented arguments that 
defense counsel had “a clear strategic reason to forgo a motion to suppress,” 
claiming the defendant would have been forced to testify at trial to support his 
defense of consent. Id. at ¶16. According to the State, to avoid the risk of cross-
examination, defense counsel made a tactical decision not to suppress the 
defendant’s confession. Id. Unconvinced by the State’s assertions, the court found 
that trial counsel actually had made an attempt to exclude the confession under 
the rules of evidence, rather than under a Miranda argument. Id. at ¶17. However, 
by failing to argue the confession was involuntary under Miranda, defense counsel 
was unsuccessful in excluding the evidence and rendered ineffective assistance. Id. 
As it has done in this case, the State argued in Millett, in spite of the record 
evidence that showed otherwise, that counsel, for strategic reasons, didn’t really 
want to present the defense later argued on appeal. The State wanted the court to 
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ignore the record evidence that showed counsel was trying, albeit impotently, to 
exclude his confession, and pretend exclusion was never part of the plan. But the 
Court of Appeals there looked to the record, found evidence that counsel actually 
tried to exclude the evidence, and reject the State’s claim that counsel had a 
strategic purpose in mind. 
The State makes the same backward argument here. Despite the clear record 
evidence showing counsel’s repeated attempts to admit the threat testimony, the 
State reimagines the case with new facts where counsel does not actually want to 
admit the evidence. The State wants this Court to ignore the record and rewrite the 
facts consistent with this new narrative. But, like the Court of Appeals in Millett, 
this Court should judge counsel’s decision in the real-time context of the case, as 
demonstrated by the record. Here, this Court should find that counsel made 
repeated attempts to admit the threat testimony as part of the defense theory. The 
question is, given that theory and the need for the evidence, could a reasonable 
defense attorney fail to respond to the State’s erroneous hearsay objection? 
Here, Scott asserts that his defense counsel’s performance fell below the 
objectively reasonable standard articulated in Strickland when he failed to make 
any argument in support of admitting the defense’s key piece of evidence. Like trial 
counsel in Millett, counsel here was clearly trying to present the defense, and had 
Scott’s counsel made the correct argument, the defense’s objective (to admit the 
evidence) would have been met. Moreover, because the value of the evidence was 
so significant for the success of Scott’s defense, there was no reasonable strategic 
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reason not to admit the evidence, as was the case in Millett. Thus, Millett provides 
a strong analogy to the present case and demonstrates why this Court should affirm 
the lower court’s opinion.  
3. Defense counsel performed in a manner no other competent 
attorney would have performed  
Teresa’s threat was clearly admissible and Tracy clearly wanted to tell the 
jury about it. Defense counsel could easily have overcome the prosecutor’s 
objection by making an elementary evidentiary argument. Yet, admittedly, the trial 
judge may have incorrectly sustained the objection, even if defense counsel had 
given a proper argument. Had he done so, Scott would have been able to raise a 
visibly different claim on appeal than ineffective assistance of counsel, that of 
preserved error. The fact is, trial counsel failed to make any argument over the 
prosecutor’s objection, precluding a preserved error appeal, and performed in a 
way no other competent attorney would have performed.  
The State seeks to justify this performance by arguing that counsel “already 
had more than enough [evidence] to add the threat piece to the larger extreme 
emotional disturbance puzzle.” Pet. Br., pg. 37. This argument misses the point. 
No reasonable attorney would conclude, after repeatedly failing to argue anything 
in response, that the threat was unnecessary. No reasonable attorney would 
repeatedly try to admit the evidence and then think, ‘I could argue it’s not hearsay, 
but I’ve already got enough evidence, so I’ll just move on without responding.’ A 
competent attorney would have raised the necessary evidentiary argument to 
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overcome the prosecutor’s first objection and get this important testimony 
admitted, or at the very least, properly preserved the issue for appeal.  
Still, the State argues that Scott’s deficient performance claim rises or falls 
with the value of Teresa’s threat to the whole evidentiary picture. Scott does not 
disagree that the rest of the evidence is important, but he does disagree with the 
limited evidence the State suggests should be considered. The State lists several 
important facts, asserting that this evidence obviated any need for admitting 
Teresa’s threat. For example, the State argues, “Defendant testified that he felt 
threatened by Teresa in many ways—the open safe, the missing gun, Teresa 
opening the garage door and leering at him, and Teresa being angry with him and 
starting fights.” Pet. Br., pg. 36. The State even asserts that on the day before the 
shooting, Scott called his mother and said, “Mom, I’m afraid. The gun safe is open 
and a gun is missing. And I think Teresa is going to kill me.” Pet. Br., pg. 10 
(quoting R.277:25). Also, in an attempt to undercut Scott’s claim to distress, the 
State maintains that despite Teresa’s threat, Scott still “slept by her side” during 
the nights leading up to Teresa’s death. Pet. Br., pg. 35.  
The State’s recitation of these facts overlooks other important facts. In the 
days leading up to Teresa’s death, Tracy tried to convince himself to stay with a 
friend (R.278:122–23), called his bishop to help him decide whether to call the 
police (R.278:128), hid in the garage rather than go inside where Teresa was 
(R.278:128), and even refused to go to the bathroom inside the home with Teresa 
there (R.278:127). Critically, the State forgets to mention that when Tracy shot 
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Teresa, he discovered her 9-millimeter Beretta laying near her on the ground next 
to the bed, fully loaded, with a round in the chamber. R.278:132. But all these facts 
make Teresa’s threat more probative, more important to the defense, not less. Even 
with all this other evidence, it would be difficult to both explain why Scott felt so 
distressed on the day of the shooting and to prevent the jury from believing Tracy 
himself “substantially caused” that distress. But, had counsel admitted Teresa’s 
threat, it could explain why Tracy believed Teresa’s was going to harm him, why 
seeing Teresa’s gun removed from the safe was so distressing, giving the jury a 
reasonable basis to find that Teresa’s actions caused Tracy’s distress, as opposed 
to his own overreactions.  
Competent counsel, knowing the value of this evidence, and knowing it was 
perfectly admissible, would have overcome the prosecution objection to the 
proffered evidence. Defense counsel, here, failed to do that. Because counsel had 
no strategic reason to not admit the evidence, failed to make a basic evidentiary 
argument to overcome the prosecutor’s objection, and acted in a way that no 
competent attorney would have, the defense’s key piece of evidence was excluded. 
Such action plainly meets Strickland’s standard for deficient performance.  
C. The Specific Content of the Contested Threat Was Not Required 
for the Court of Appeals to Find Counsel’s Performance Deficient  
 
 The State maintains that “[w]ithout knowing the content of the threat, 
concluding that it necessarily would have strengthened the defense was mere 
speculation.” Pet. Brf. at 43. The Court of Appeals did not rely on the content of the 
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threat to reach its conclusion; nor did it have to. As to the deficient performance 
test, the details of the threat were significantly less important than the source of 
the threat. Defense counsel admitted multiple pieces of evidence to support Scott’s 
defense of extreme emotional distress, pointing to Teresa’s gun missing from the 
open safe, Teresa glaring at Scott in the garage on multiple occasions, Tracy’s 
unwillingness to go inside the home while Teresa was there, his unwillingness to 
even use the restroom while Teresa was inside, and Teresa’s hostile behavior 
towards Scott on the day of the shooting. R.278:112, 128, 127, 131. But, this 
evidence, taken as a whole, may not have been sufficient for the jury to believe 
Tracy was under extreme emotional distress caused by someone else’s action at the 
time of the shooting. Rather, this limited evidentiary picture would, and likely did, 
lead the jury to believe Tracy had “substantially caused” his own emotional 
distress.  
 The jury likely believed Tracy overreacted to his circumstances, causing his 
own distress. It follows then, that if the jury could hear testimony that Teresa had 
actually made a verbal threat to Tracy in the days leading up to the shooting, it 
would change the source of Tracy’s distress and change the way the jury viewed 
Tracy’s interpretation of Teresa’s other actions. No longer would Tracy’s 
overreaction be the sole cause of that distress, but the jury could impute 
responsibility for that distress onto Teresa for verbally threatening Tracy which he 
continued to consider and view each new circumstance in light of the threat. Thus, 
the fact that the record did not contain the contents of the threat matters 
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significantly less than the fact that the Court of Appeals understood the evidence 
was a verbal threat from Teresa.  
 That missing piece of evidence was sufficient justification for the Court to 
conclude that defense counsel had performed unreasonably in failing to admit the 
threat. In other words, the question is whether defense counsel could reasonably 
raise his defense, and overcome the “substantially caused” barrier to that defense, 
without the threat. The Court of Appeals concluded he could not. It pointed to the 
prosecutor’s closing argument, who asked the jury “what reasonable basis does 
[Tracy] have to make [the] claim that simply the absence of that gun from the safe 
creates extreme emotional distress[?]” Scott, ¶33. Without the threat, Tracy had 
no reasonable basis to make that claim. The Court of Appeals’ reasoning mirrors 
this conclusion. Scott asks the Court do to the same.  
II. TRIAL COUNSEL’S DEFICIENT PERFORMANCE CAUSED 
ACTUAL PREJUDICE TO THE DEFENSE, CREATING A 
REASONABLE PROBABILITY THAT THE TRIAL’S OUTCOME 
WOULD HAVE BEEN DIFFERENT  
 
 Strickland also requires a defendant “show that the deficient performance 
prejudiced the defense.” Strickland, 687. “This requires showing that counsel’s 
errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result 
is reliable.” Id. “It is not enough for the defendant to show that the errors had some 
conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding.” Id. at 693. Instead, 
Strickland requires the defendant show “there is a reasonable probability that, but 
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for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different.” Id. at 694.  
 As it did in the previous issue, the State complains the lower court had an 
inadequate record on appeal, and thus could not properly reach the question of 
whether defense counsel’s actions prejudiced the defense. Without the specific 
contents of the threat in the record, the State argues, the Court of Appeals could 
not evaluate the prejudicial effect on trial counsel’s unprofessional errors. Pet. Br., 
pg. 47. Again, the State exaggerates Strickland’s requirements regarding the record 
on appeal. Neither prong of the Strickland test demands a complete, perfect 
record, absent of any errors. Rather, Strickland and its progeny require an 
adequate, unambiguous record. 
The record on appeal in this case is both adequate enough, and clear enough 
to establish that had defense counsel succeeded in admitting Teresa’s threat, the 
defense’s key piece of evidence, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable 
outcome. Scott does not deny that the content of the threat is persuasive, this is 
exactly the reason he filed a 23B motion to the Court of Appeals as a backup in case 
the court disagreed with the IAC claim in his brief. But Scott denies that the Court 
of Appeals was unable, based on the existing record, to conclude counsel’s error 
was prejudicial. But for counsel’s failure to admit the testimony, the trial would 
likely have resulted in a different outcome. Scott respectfully asks this Court to 
affirm the lower court’s opinion.  
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A. Whether the Record on Appeal was Inadequate is Not a 
Threshold Issue for Evaluating the Merits of Scott’s Prejudice 
Claim   
 
In 1992, Rule 23B of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure was adopted, 
“designed to address the inadequate record dilemma” in ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims. State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, ¶14, 12 P.3d 92. In such claims, 
“counsel’s ineffectiveness may have caused, exacerbated, or contributed to the 
record deficiencies, thus presenting the defendant with a catch–22 unique to 
claims of ineffectiveness of trial counsel.” Id. at ¶12 (citing Hurst, 777 P.2d at 1036, 
n. 6 (noting ineffectiveness of counsel as an example of the type of error that may 
arise outside the record)). With the adoption of Rule 23B, however, “a ready 
procedural mechanism for addressing the inadequate record dilemma was grafted 
into the appeals process.” Id. at ¶14.  
Rule 23B permits a reviewing court “to remand the case to the trial court for 
entry of finding of fact, necessary for the appellate court’s determination of a claim 
of ineffective assistance of counsel.” UT.R.APP.P. 23B(a). “In this light, appellate 
courts need no longer treat the question of an adequate record as a necessary 
threshold issue.” Litherland, 2000 UT 76, ¶17. Instead, if the record “appears 
inadequate in any fashion, ambiguities or deficiencies resulting therefrom simply 
will be construed in favor of a finding that counsel performed effectively.” Id.  
Litherland obviates the need for a Court to conclude, based on the adequacy 
of a record, whether to proceed into a defendant’s ineffectiveness claim. Yet, the 
State begins its prejudice argument by making an assertion that conflicts with 
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Litherland’s holding. Because the record was “legally insufficient,” the State 
argues, the Court of Appeals’ “prejudice holding fails for this reason alone. And 
because prejudice is a necessary element of an ineffective assistance claim, the 
entire claim fails for this reason.” See Pet. Bf., pg. 48. As explained above, however, 
this Court has clearly established that the question of an adequate record is no 
longer a threshold issue. Moreover, Scott availed himself of Rule 23B’s procedures 
by filing a motion for remand.6 The Court of Appeals never ruled on Scott’s 23B 
motion, issuing its decision without deciding whether Scott had met the 
requirements under Rule 23B. In doing so, the Court of Appeals found itself 
capable of analyzing the prejudice prong of Strickland’s test without 
supplementing the record with the words of Teresa’s threat. The State complains 
this is error.  
However, in grating the State’s Petition for Writ of Certiorari, this Court did 
not address as an issue on appeal whether the lower court erred in completing its 
Strickland analysis before ruling on the 23B motion. Therefore, despite the State’s 
contention that the record is “legally insufficient” (Pet. Bf., pg. 48), Scott 
respectfully asks the Court to proceed in the following manner: 1) Make a finding 
that the record is adequate for the purposes of conducting a Strickland analysis 
and affirm the lower court’s conclusions; 2) Give leave for Scott to file a 23B motion 
to this Court to supplement the record on appeal; or 3) Remand the case for the 
                                                
6 See Addendum B. 
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Court of Appeals to rule on the prior 23B motion Scott filed in that court.7 Scott 
maintains that the Court of Appeals was correct, and that the record is adequate 
for disposition of this appeal, and sufficient to find trial counsel’s performance 
prejudicial to the defense.  
B. The Record on Appeal Adequately and Clearly Establishes the 
Need to Admit Teresa’s Threat During Trial  
As indicted above, the Court of Appeals found the record adequate to 
conduct its Strickland analysis. It noted that while the jury had heard Scott testify 
that there was a threat made, “he was not allowed to offer any other information 
regarding the threat, including the surrounding circumstances, the words used, 
and the effect it had on him.” Scott, ¶33. The court contrasted Scott’s impeded 
testimony with the closing argument of the prosecutor, who stated Teresa “was no 
threat” and asked the jury “what reasonable basis does [Scott] have to make [the] 
claim that simply the absence of that gun from the safe creates extreme emotional 
distress[?]” Id. Had Teresa’s threat been admitted, the court concluded, “Scott 
would have given the jury more evidence on the very point that was in dispute.” Id.  
Whether Scott experienced extreme emotional distress before the shooting 
proved to be some point of contention during deliberations, since “the jury notes 
demonstrate the jury was at an impasse over whether Scott had substantially 
                                                
7 What this Court cannot do, what it must not do, is reverse the Court of Appeals’ 
decision on the grounds that the record is inadequate without allowing Scott access 
to Rule 23B to supplement the record. Scott followed the rules, and filed his motion 
with accompanying affidavits. To reverse the Court of Appeals and deny Scott’s 
appeal without having his 23B motion ruled on would be fundamentally unfair. 
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caused the distress he felt.” Id. at ¶34. Testimony about Teresa’s threat would have 
“reinforced the sentiments” of the two jurors who believed Scott acted under 
extreme emotional distress. Id. Additionally, other jurors suspecting that 
“substantially caused” meant “the majority of the time,” would have been 
influenced by this testimony. Id. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals made a logical 
conclusion based on these reasonable outcomes: “had Scott been allowed to testify 
about the threat, there is a reasonable probability the jury would have continued 
to be deadlocked, ending the case in a mistrial.” Id. That probability was enough 
to undermine the court’s confidence in the outcome of the trial. Id. (citing 
Strickland, 466 U.S. 668).  
For the State, however, the court’s analysis operated in a vacuum, failing to 
consider all the evidence presented at trial. Pet. Br., pgs. 48–49. To prove special 
mitigation of extreme emotional stress, the State argues, Scott must have been 
“exposed to extremely unusual and overwhelming stress that would have caused 
the average reasonable person under the same circumstances to experience a loss 
of self-control and be overborne by intense feelings, such as passion, anger, 
distress, grief, excessive agitation, or other similar emotions.” Pet. Br., pg. 49 
(quoting State v. White, 2011 UT 21, ¶26, 251 P.3d 820 (quoting, in turn, State v. 
Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 471 (Utah 1988))) (internal quotation marks omitted). Scott, 
the State claims, “did not act under distress… Nor would a reasonable person have 
reacted in the same way Defendant did….” Pet. Br., pg. 50. Instead, the State 
asserts that Teresa’s killing was the result of disrespect and bullying. Id.  
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 The State’s arguments and factual recitations seem to overlook how 
distressful Tracy’s circumstances truly were. The couple’s fighting had grown 
significantly worse in the days leading up to the shooting, the “get in your face, yell, 
scream at each other, spit flying…” kind of fighting. R.278:107; 160. Then, on the 
day before the shooting, Scott first noticed Teresa’s gun missing from the couple’s 
safe. R.278:112. Contemplate that for a moment. At a time when this couple was 
fighting worse than they had ever fought, Teresa introduced a gun.  
 Tracy worried that Teresa was going to use the gun to harm him, and refused 
to go inside while Teresa was there, even to the point that he preferred to urinate 
outside to avoid her. R.278:117, 125–127. While working in the garage, Tracy 
noticed Teresa leaning her head out of the door and staring at him, at least on two 
separate occasions. R.278:128–29. Then, when Teresa began yelling at him from 
inside the house, Tracy snapped and stormed inside. R.278:131. When Tracy came 
into the bedroom, he was still thinking about that threat and that gun, and when 
he looked down he saw Teresa’s gun missing again, so grabbed his own gun and 
shot Teresa. R.278:131. Immediately after shooting Teresa, Tracy found the 
missing gun within inches of Teresa, next to the bed, fully loaded, with a round in 
the chamber. R.278:131.  
The jury was tasked with finding whether Tracy acted under the influence of 
extreme emotional distress, whether the “then-existing circumstances expose[d] 
him to extremely unusual and overwhelming stress” that caused an “extreme 
emotional reaction”. R.200. Specifically, the jury was asked to determine whether 
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a reasonable person under these circumstances would have “experienced a loss of 
self-control and had his reason overborne by intense feelings such as anger, 
distress, grief, excessive agitation, or other similar emotions.” R.200, see also 
UTAH CODE §76-5-205.5. The jury was instructed that emotional distress did not 
include “distress that is substantially caused by the defendant’s own conduct.” 
R.199. With the law of special mitigation in mind, the State argues “[Scott] could 
not prove that he acted under extreme emotional distress. His theory was simply 
unbelievable.” Pet. Br. 50. If that is true, it is precisely because the jury did not hear 
the one piece of evidence that would have contextualized and legitimized Tracy’s 
fear that Teresa was going to harm him, the piece of evidence that would have shed 
light on why Teresa’s other acts, like yelling at time from inside the home, 
repeatedly staring at him from the door, and repeatedly removing her gun from the 
safe would have caused him extreme distress. As the Court of Appeals noted, 
without this evidence, the jury would not have understood “any other information 
regarding the threat, including the surrounding circumstances, the words used, 
and the effect it had on him.” Scott, ¶33. Instead, the jury was left with unspecified 
testimony that some threat had been made. The significance this evidence would 
have had is evident when the jury’s questions are reviewed. Even the limited 
evidence the jury did hear caused an “absolute impasse.” R.182, 280:78. Even 
without knowing how Teresa had threatened Tracy, some of the jurors were 
convinced he was not the one who substantially caused his extreme emotional 
distress. R.182.  
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But without testimony about the threat, the jury eventually did not find that 
Tracy acted under extreme emotional distress when he shot Teresa. This missing 
evidentiary link was absolutely crucial to the defense, and as the Court of Appeals 
concluded, “had Scott been allowed to testify about the threat, there is a reasonable 
probability the jury would have continued to be deadlocked, ending the case in a 
mistrial.” Scott, ¶34. This conclusion was not controversial. The threat evidence 
tied the entire story together for the defense. The threat evidence showed why 
Tracy’s seemingly outrageous behavior was rooted in a legitimate emotional 
reaction to Teresa’s conduct. 
The Court of Appeals did not have had the specific details of Teresa’s threat 
before it, nor could it relied on those details during its prejudice analysis. 
Nonetheless, the importance and weight of the fact that there had been a threat to 
the entire evidentiary picture and to the possible success of Scott’s defense was 
squarely on the mind of the court. As such, the court’s conclusion represents an 
appropriate analysis of a reasonably likely alternative outcome, but for trial 
counsel’s deficient performance. For these reasons, Scott respectfully asks this 
Court to affirm the lower court’s opinion and remand the case for a new trial.  
C. If the Record on Appeal is Inadequate This Court Should Allow 
Scott to File His 23B Motion or Remand to Allow the Court of 
Appeals to Grant the Motion 
 If the Court finds the record is inadequate to determine prejudice (or 
deficiency for that matter) the Court should not reach the merits of the case. 
Instead the Court should grant leave for Scott to file his Rule 23B motion. 
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According to Rule 23B motions for remand must be “filed prior to the filing of the 
appellant’s brief.” UT.R.APP.P. 23B(a). However, given the procedural posture of 
the case, a 23B motion would not be appropriately filed unless and until this Court 
finds the Court of Appeals erred by ruling with an inadequate record. That 
circumstance would fall within this Court’s ability to “remand[] the case under this 
rule on its own motion at any time if the claim has been raised and the motion 
would have been available to a party.” Id.  
 The motion filed with the Court of Appeals is prepared and can be filed as 
soon as the Court will accept it. The State’s response filed with the Court of Appeals 
is prepared and conceivably, the State could file it immediately. 
 Finally, if this Court is not prepared or interested in deciding the 23B 
question, it should remand the case to the Court of Appeals with an order to rule 
on the previously filed 23B motion. Scott has no doubt that he has met the 
requirements for a 23B remand. 
CONCLUSION 
 Though the State characterizes trial counsel’s performance as reasonable 
trial strategy, the facts of this case neither support that argument, nor provide 
justification for counsel’s failure to admit the threat. Where admission of the threat 
evidence was clearly part of the defense, a competent attorney would have made 
the basic evidentiary argument necessary to admit the threat. Trial counsel made 
no argument for its admission. Such inaction, therefore, falls below the objectively 
reasonable representation required by Strickland.  
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 Counsel’s inadequate representation prevented the jury from hearing 
evidence necessary to find that Teresa caused Scott’s extreme emotional distress. 
While the State underestimates the impact of this testimony on the jury, the record 
clearly establishes that the jury felt conflicted about whether Tracy or Teresa had 
caused his distress. If Teresa’s threat had been presented in evidence, there is a 
reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different, 
that the jury, or at least one member of the jury, would have believed special 
mitigation applied. For these reasons, Scott respectfully asks this Court to affirm 
the Court of Appeals’ decision, and remand the case for a new trial. 
 If the Court finds the record is inadequate, the Court should grant Scott leave 
to file his 23B motion, or in the alternative, remand the case to the Court of Appeals 
with direction to rule upon the 23B motion. 
 In any event, because the Court of Appeals did not rule on Scott’s verdict 
urging claim, unless this Court remands for a new trial on ineffectiveness grounds, 
the Court should remand to the Court of Appeals to address the remaining issue. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 28th day of December, 2017. 
        /s/ Douglas Thompson   
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MAY 0 ~ 2017 
<j[l Tracy Scott was convicted of murdering his wife. He 
appeals, contending he received ineffective assistance of counsel 
during trial. We agree and reverse and remand for a new trial. 
State v. Scott 
BACKGROUND 
<[2 Tracy Scott and Teresa Scott1 were married for nineteen 
years. They had two sons. 
<[3 Scott and Teresa's relationship was both "good and bad." 
Some described it as happy and loving, but it was also 
contentious, and they fought often. The fights were "explosive" 
and involved taunting, threatening, name calling, profanity, and 
sometimes, throwing things at each other. Each of them 
frequently threatened divorce, and Scott threatened Teresa's life 
"multiple times." 
<[4 The police were called to the couple's house on a number 
of occasions and in 2008 cited Scott for domestic violence. In that 
incident, the couple argued, Scott tried to hit Teresa with their 
car, then threw a towel over her face and punched her in the 
stomach. Teresa filed for a restraining order and they separated, 
but she later had the restraining order removed and Scott's 
citation was expunged. The pair reunited. 
<[5 Many of the couple's arguments revolved around 
finances. The family incurred debt so Teresa could earn a degree, 
but her lack of employment after graduation was a source of 
conflict. Teresa criticized Scott for spending money on trips and 
firearms instead of paying bills or having their roof repaired. 
<[6 Some witnesses testified Scott was the aggressor in the 
couple's fights-that he got more upset and was "more 
aggressive" than Teresa and that he was responsible for 
"[e]ighty percent" of the contention. Some testified that Teresa 
"escalate[d]" the situation, that she "nitpick[ed] and push[ed]" 
1. Because the parties share a last name, we refer to Teresa by her 
first name for clarity, with no disrespect intended by the 
apparent informality. See Earhart v. Earhart, 2015 UT App 308, <[ 2 
n.l, 365 P.3d 719. 
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Scott, and kept "gnawing [at] him" and did "not let stuff go." 
Scott's coworkers testified that Teresa frequently called his cell 
phone while he was at work, and the two would argue over the 
phone. If Scott did not answer his phone, Teresa would call the 
shop phone or come to his workplace. These calls occurred 
several times a week, sometimes two or three times a day, for 
four or five years. 
<[7 Leading up to the events of this case, Scott and Teresa's 
relationship "started to get bad again." Her calls to Scott's work 
became more frequent. Remarks between them "got nastier" and 
"more hateful," and in the weeks before her death, Scott and 
Teresa had "constant arguments." Their fighting was "[w]orse 
than it had ever been." 
<[8 The day before Teresa's death, Scott and Teresa began 
"fighting and arguing" while Scott was changing the oil in a 
family car. The argument got "really bad." Scott spilled oil in the 
driveway, and they continued to fight about the spill and the 
lack of money to replace the oil. Later, Scott saw that Teresa's 
mother had called, and he took the phone into their bedroom to 
give it to Teresa. He saw her crouched by the end of the bed, but 
did not know what she was doing. As he turned to leave the 
room, he saw that the family's gun safe had been pulled out 
from under the dresser where it was usually kept and that it was 
open. He also saw that Teresa's gun was not in the safe. 
<[9 Scott testified he was "scared to death" when he saw the 
gun was missing. He was nervous and worried, and he went to 
the garage and stayed there until their sons came home. He did 
not sleep well that night. The next day Scott ran errands, and 
while he was putting new tires on the car, twice purchased the 
wrong size because he "[wasn't] thinking straight." Scott did not 
want to go home and instead called a coworker to ask if he could 
spend the night at the coworker's house. The coworker 
responded that he could meet Scott later that day, and Scott 
went home. He did some yard work, but he and Teresa were 
fighting the "whole time." 
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<[10 Scott went inside the house to use the bathroom. As he 
walked into the bedroom, he saw Teresa sitting by the end of the 
bed. Although the gun safe had been shut and put away under 
the dresser, it was again open and pulled out, and Teresa's gun 
was still missing. Scott immediately left the house without using 
the bathroom. He went to the garage, and while he was there, he 
saw Teresa several times leaning her head out the door and 
staring at him. Scott called his ecclesiastical leader because he 
"didn't know what to do"; he testified that he "really start[ed] to 
wig out, just freak out." 
<[11 Finally, Scott decided to return to the house and 
"confront" the matter. As he walked in, he could hear Teresa 
talking on the phone with her mother. While he was in the 
kitchen, Teresa yelled at him, and he "snapped" and "[saw] 
red." He stormed into the bedroom where he saw her lying on 
the bed and pointing her cell phone at him. He looked down at 
the safe and saw that her gun was still missing. He reached 
down, grabbed the other gun from the safe, and shot Teresa 
three times, killing her, then called 911. The police arrived and 
arrested Scott. 
<[12 At trial, Scott admitted to killing Teresa, but he argued 
that he had acted under extreme emotional distress, which 
would mitigate the murder charge to manslaughter. 
<[13 Scott testified that "there was a threat made" and when he 
saw Teresa's gun missing from the safe he "thought the threat 
was serious." Defense counsel asked him to elaborate: "When 
you say a threat [was] made, are you saying-Who threatened 
who?" As Scott started to explain the background of the threat, 
the prosecutor objected that it was hearsay. The court sustained 
the objection and in a sidebar conversation stated, "There's no 
way that you're going to dance around and get [in] a threat 
without [it] being hearsay." Defense counsel said "Okay," and 
did not offer any counterargument. Counsel continued his 
questioning, asking, "After you saw the safe open ... then what 
were you thinking?" Scott replied, "I was thinking that the threat 
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that I had received the day before ... [t]hat she was going to-
she was .... " The court interrupted Scott and called for another 
sidebar discussion. The court warned defense counsel to stay 
away from that line of questioning, because "the only responses 
[it was] getting are clearly hearsay." Counsel agreed and made 
no attempt to argue that the statements were not hearsay and 
were admissible. Scott did not mention the threat again.2 
<[14 At the conclusion of trial, the court instructed the jury on 
the elements of murder and the special mitigation of extreme 
emotional distress. The instructions stated: 
A person acts under the influence of extreme 
emotional distress when the then-existing 
circumstances expose him to extremely unusual 
and overwhelming stress that would cause the 
average reasonable person under that stress to 
have an extreme emotional reaction, as a result of 
which he experienced a loss of self-control and had 
his reason overborne by intense feelings such as 
passion, anger, distress, grief, excessive agitation, 
or other similar emotions. 
The instructions also stated that '"[e]motional' distress does not 
include . . . distress that is substantially caused by the 
defendant's own conduct." 
<[15 The jury deliberated for more than five hours and sent 
two notes to the court. One note asked, "What is the legal 
definition of 'substantially caused?"' The next note informed the 
court, "We are at an absolute impasse, 6-2," and continued, 
"Two feel that 'substantially caused' needs to be 'the majority of 
the time."' Defense counsel moved for a mistrial on the basis that 
2. Scott's testimony did not include the actual words of the 
threat. The threat's content is not included in the record on 
appeal, and we do not rely upon it in our analysis. 
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"absolute impasse" meant that the jury could not "continu[e] to 
deliberate without doing violence to their individual judgment." 
The court denied the motion for a mistrial and instead gave a 
supplemental jury instruction, which asked the jury to "continue 
[its] deliberations in an effort to agree upon a verdict." The 
instruction stated, in part, 
This trial represents a significant expenditure of 
time and effort by you, the court, the parties, and 
their attorneys ... and there is no reason to believe 
that the case can be tried again by either side better 
or more exhaustively than it has been tried to 
you ... . Nevertheless ... it is your duty as jurors to 
consult with one another and to deliberate, with a 
view to reaching an agreement, if you can do so 
without violence to your individual judgment. 
<[16 After receiving the supplemental instruction, the jury 
deliberated for two more hours and found Scott guilty of 
murder. Scott was sentenced to prison for fifteen years to life. He 
appeals the conviction. 
ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
<[17 Scott raises two issues on appeal. First he contends the 
trial court erred by giving a verdict-urging instruction when the 
jury was at an absolute impasse. He also contends his counsel 
provided ineffective assistance at trial. Because we conclude 
Scott did not receive effective assistance of counsel and reverse 
on this basis, we need not address the propriety of the court's 
supplemental instruction. 
<[18 When a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is raised 
for the first time on appeal, there is no lower court ruling to 
review, and this court must decide whether the defendant was 
deprived of effective assistance as a matter of law. Layton City v. 
Carr, 2014 UT App 227, <[ 6, 336 P.3d 587. To demonstrate 
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ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show that his 
counsel performed deficiently and that he was prejudiced by the 
deficient performance. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 
(1984). 
ANALYSIS 
I. Deficient Performance 
<[19 Scott argues that his counsel's performance was deficient 
because, when the prosecutor objected to testimony regarding a 
threat Teresa made to Scott, defense counsel did not attempt to 
argue the threat was nonhearsay and thus admissible. Scott 
asserts defense counsel had no tactical purpose for failing to 
make this argument. 
<[20 To show deficient performance under Strickland, Scott 
must demonstrate that counsel's performance "fell below an 
objective standard of reasonableness." Id. at 688. This standard 
asks "whether an attorney's representation amounted to 
incompetence under 'prevailing professional norms,' not 
whether it deviated from best practices or most common 
custom." Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 105 (2011) (quoting 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690). Scott must also "rebut the strong 
presumption that 'under the circumstances, the challenged 
action might be considered sound trial strategy."' State v. 
Litherland, 2000 UT 76, <[ 19, 12 P.3d 92 (quoting Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 689) (additional internal quotation marks omitted). 
<[21 Scott argues on appeal that Teresa's threat was not 
hearsay and was therefore admissible. "Hearsay" is defined as 
an out-of-court statement that "a party offers in evidence to 
prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement." Utah R. 
Evid. 801(c). Scott argues the threat was not hearsay because it 
was not offered to show the truth of the matter asserted-rather, 
it was offered to show its impact on Scott. See R. Collin 
Mangrum & Dee Benson, Mangrum & Benson on Utah Evidence 
779 (2016) (noting that statements may be relevant "because of 
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their effect on the hearer" and that such statements have 
"consistently been held to be nonhearsay in a variety of 
contexts"). 
<[22 The State conceded on appeal that the threat was not 
hearsay, and we agree with both Scott and the State that the 
threat was not hearsay. Like questions and commands, threats 
are commonly not hearsay, because they do not make assertions 
capable of being proved true or false. See United States v. Stratton, 
779 F.2d 820, 830 (2d Cir. 1985) (stating that a defendant's 
"threats are not hearsay because [they were] not offered for their 
truth; the threats are verbal acts"). Here, Scott's testimony 
concerning the threat was not offered to prove the truth of what 
Teresa asserted but was offered to show its effect on Scott. Scott's 
defense depended on demonstrating he shot Teresa while under 
extreme emotional distress not caused by his own conduct. 
Testimony about the threat's impact would further Scott's 
defense that his distress came from an external source. And as 
Scott testified, when he saw that Teresa's gun was missing from 
the safe, he "thought the threat was serious." Whether the threat 
"[was] true is irrelevant, since the crucial factors are that the 
statements were made and that they influenced the defendant[' s] 
behavior." See State v. Salmon, 612 P.2d 366, 369 (Utah 1980) 
(concluding testimony was not hearsay when it was offered, 
"not to prove the truth of what [the informant] said to 
defendants, but rather to show that [the informant] had made 
statements which induced defendants to commit the offense"). 
<[23 The threat was not inadmissible hearsay, and it follows 
that if defense counsel had demonstrated this through proper 
argument, the court would have allowed Scott to testify about it. 
<[24 Scott next argues that his counsel's failure to correctly 
argue the rules of evidence fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness. We agree. 
<[25 In this instance, defense counsel failed to correctly use the 
rules of evidence to support Scott's defense: counsel did not 
argue the threat was admissible because it was offered to show 
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its effect on Scott, rather than to prove the truth of what Teresa 
asserted. Counsel's failure was unreasonable, especially in light 
of Scott's trial strategy, which was to show that his distress 
originated outside his own behavior. A serious threat to Scott 
from Teresa would have been an important piece of evidence at 
trial, and a reasonable attorney would have used the rules of 
evidence to explain to the court why the threat was admissible. 
Counsel's lack of argument did not merely "deviate[] from best 
practices or most common custom" -it amounted to deficient 
performance. See Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 105 (2011). 
<[26 The State argues defense counsel's performance was not 
deficient because "counsel had a sound strategic reason not to 
seek to admit the specific words of Teresa's alleged threat." 
Further, it argues defense counsel did not seek to admit the 
specific words of the threat because an "imaginary threat" could 
have had a greater impact on the jury than hearing the actual 
words. 
<[27 We do not agree that this was a sound strategic reason for 
counsel's actions. While an "imaginary threat" could have 
allowed the jury to conjure something worse than what Scott 
would have testified to, the converse is also true. Testimony 
about the threat's actual content could have connected it to 
various other aspects of Scott's testimony, including Teresa's 
threatening behavior in other contexts, and would have 
established the foundation for testimony about Scott's reaction to 
seeing the empty gun safe. As it was, Scott did not testify about 
it and counsel did not refer to it in closing argument, even 
though the underpinning of Scott's defense was that he acted 
under distress not substantially caused by his own conduct. 
Under these circumstances, the negative repercussions of 
omitting the content of the threat were greater than the possible 
benefits; admitting its content would only have strengthened 
Scott's defense. We therefore conclude defense counsel's actions 
could not have been sound trial strategy. 
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<[28 Because the threat was central to a defense that focused 
on trying to show that Scott's conduct originated from distress 
caused by a source other than his own conduct, there was no 
strategic reason for counsel not to argue that the threat was 
admissible. Scott has therefore met his burden in showing that 
his defense counsel's performance was deficient. 
II. Prejudice 
<[29 To demonstrate prejudice, Scott must show there is a 
"reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional 
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A 
reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine 
confidence in the outcome." See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 
668, 694 (1984). 
<[30 Scott argues that prejudice is evident because "the jurors 
expressed their concerns about the very point of law that the 
excluded evidence would have had a significant impact on." 
Because Scott admitted he killed Teresa, the sole issue at trial 
was whether the killing was mitigated by extreme emotional 
distress. The notes the jury delivered to the court indicate its 
deliberations had narrowed in on the definition of "substantially 
caused." This suggests one or more of the jurors was struggling 
with whether Scott had "substantially caused" the distress he 
was experiencing. The second note illuminates how the jury was 
split: "We are at an absolute impasse, 6-2. Two feel that 
'substantially caused' needs to be 'the majority of the time."' 
Only after a verdict-urging instruction and two more hours of 
deliberation did the jury arrive at a guilty verdict. 
<[31 Scott argues the jury's second note demonstrates that two 
of the jurors, if not more, 3 believed Scott was "suffering under 
3. The jury stated it was "at an absolute impasse, 6-2" and that 
"[t]wo feel that 'substantially caused' needs to be 'the majority of 
the time."' At a minimum, two jurors apparently believed at that 
(continued ... ) 
20140995-CA 10 2017 UT App 74 
State v. Scott 
the influence of extreme emotional distress" not substantially 
caused by his own conduct. As a result, Scott reasons that if the 
jury had been given more specific evidence regarding the threat, 
there is a reasonable probability that the result of the trial would 
have been different. 
<[32 The State argues there is no reasonable likelihood the 
outcome of the trial would have been different if the jury had 
heard the specific words of Teresa's threat. The jury heard 
testimony from Scott that Teresa threatened him and that he 
believed the threat was serious. The jury also heard that after 
Scott saw the gun missing, he was "scared to death" and 
"worried that Teresa was going to use that gun to do some harm 
to [him]." Because of this testimony, the State argues that the 
"specific words of [the] threat ... would have added little, if 
anything, to what the jury already heard." 
<[33 Even though Scott testified that "there was a threat made" 
and seeing that Teresa's gun was missing from the safe made 
him think "the threat was serious," he was not allowed to offer 
any other information regarding the threat, including the 
surrounding circumstances, the words used, and the effect it had 
on him. After the court warned defense counsel the threat was 
hearsay and would not be admitted, counsel did not inquire into 
it again and did not argue, or even imply, that the threat played 
a role in special mitigation. In contrast, the prosecutor's closing 
argument stated that Teresa "was no threat" and had not 
( ... continued) 
point that Scott was acting under extreme emotional distress not 
substantially caused by his own conduct. It is also possible two 
other jurors did not believe Scott qualified for the mitigation 
because he had caused his distress "the majority of the time." 
And it is not impossible that six jurors believed Scott qualified 
for mitigation, while the other two maintained that Scott did not 
qualify because he had caused his distress the majority of the 
time. 
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"provoke[d] him" and asked the jury "what reasonable basis 
does [Scott] have to make [the] claim that simply the absence of 
that gun from the safe creates extreme emotional distress[?]" For 
these reasons, we are persuaded that testimony of the specific 
threat and its effect on Scott would have given the jury more 
evidence on the very point that was in dispute. 
<[34 In sum, the jury notes demonstrate the jury was at an 
impasse over whether Scott had substantially caused the distress 
he felt. At least two jurors were so convinced that Scott acted 
under extreme emotional distress that the jury described its 
position as an "absolute impasse." Testimony about the threat 
would have directly reinforced the sentiments of these two 
jurors. That testimony also might have influenced the jurors who 
believed that "substantially caused" meant "the majority of the 
time." Consequently, had Scott been allowed to testify about the 
threat, there is a reasonable probability the jury would have 
continued to be deadlocked, ending the case in a mistrial. This 
probability is enough to undermine our confidence in the 
outcome of this trial. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 
694 (1984). 
CONCLUSION 
<[35 We conclude Scott received ineffective assistance of 
counsel and therefore reverse and remand for a new trial. 
VOROS, Judge (concurring): 
<[36 I concur in the majority opinion as a correct statement and 
application of the law. I write separately to express my concern 
with the law of extreme emotional distress as it presently exists 
in Utah, particularly as applied in the context of intimate 
relationships. 
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<J.[37 The facts of the present crime must be viewed against the 
backdrop of a relationship in which Scott was the usual 
aggressor. He would call Teresa names like "bitch" or "just 
anything ... that could hurt her and make her feel like she was a 
bad person." In fact, his contact name for her in his cell phone 
was "Bitch Teresa." Scott threatened "multiple times" to kill 
Teresa, promising that "'one of these days I'm going to kill 
you."' In fact, he did try to kill Teresa once, attempting to run 
her over with their SUV while their sons were in the back seat. 
Teresa jumped out of the way. The boys also saw Scott "get 
physical" with Teresa. One time he threw a towel at Teresa's face 
and "started punching her in the gut." Another time he 
"slammed" a vacuum into her legs. 
<J.[38 Teresa would also get mad and yell, but she did not get as 
angry or aggressive as Scott. The boys never saw her "get 
physical" with him, call him names, or threaten him. She did call 
the police a few times. Scott called the police too. During one of 
the police visits, Scott asked the responding officer to tell Teresa 
to "stop touching" him. In all, the police came to their home "six 
to eight times." They arrested Scott on one occasion (he pleaded 
guilty to domestic violence assault). Teresa obtained a protective 
order, they separated, but they soon got back together. On the 
day of the shooting, one of the couple's sons received a call from 
a friend who asked why the police were at his house; the son 
called home and nobody answered. He rushed home, worried 
that Scott had "finally killed her." When the other son heard 
there had been a fatal shooting, he worried that his "mom was 
dead." 
<J.[39 And what, according to Scott, ignited his extreme 
emotional distress? After a fight, he noticed a handgun missing; 
he heard Teresa on the phone with her mother; she yelled 
something to him; he stormed into the bedroom and saw her 
lying on the bed pointing her cell phone at him. In response, he 
grabbed a gun from the gun safe, cocked it, and shot her three 
times. 
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<JI40 I do not believe the law should mitigate the culpability of 
one who kills under these circumstances. "What is generally 
known as the provocation defense has for two decades been 
criticized as mitigating violence committed by men against 
women in intimate relationships." State v. Sanchez, 2016 UT App 
189, <JI 40 n.9, 380 P.3d 375, cert. granted, 390 P.3d 719 (Utah 2017) 
and 390 P.3d 727 (Utah 2017). It now "is one of the most 
controversial doctrines in the criminal law because of its 
perceived gender bias; yet most American scholars and 
lawmakers have not recommended that it be abolished." 
Carolyn B. Ramsey, Provoking Change: Comparative Insights on 
Feminist Homicide Law Reform, 100 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 33, 
33 (2010); see also Emily L. Miller, (Wo)manslaughter: Voluntary 
Manslaughter, Gender, and the Model Penal Code, 50 Emory L.J. 665, 
667 (2001) ("Voluntary manslaughter has never been a female-
friendly doctrine."); Victoria Nourse, Passion's Progress: Modern 
Law Reform and the Provocation Defense, 106 Yale L.J. 1331, 1332 
(1997) ("Our most modern and enlightened legal ideal of 
'passion' reflects, and thus perpetuates, ideas about men, 
women, and their relationships that society long ago 
abandoned."); Laurie J. Taylor, Provoked Reason in Men and 
Women: Heat-of-Passion Manslaughter and Imperfect Self-Defense, 33 
UCLA L. Rev. 1679, 1679 (1986) ("[T]he legal standards that 
define adequate provocation and passionate 'human' 
weaknesses reflect a male view of understandable homicidal 
violence."). 
<jI41 In my judgment, the law should mitigate the culpability 
of homicides only where society as a whole can to some degree 
share the rage animating the killing: 
To maintain its monopoly on violence, the State 
must condemn, at least partially, those who take 
the law in their own hands. At the same time, 
however, some provoked murder cases temper our 
feelings of revenge with the recognition of tragedy. 
Some defendants who take the law in their own 
hands respond with a rage shared by the law. In 
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such cases, we "understand" the defendant's 
emotions because these are the very emotions to 
which the law itself appeals for the legitimacy of its 
own use of violence. At the same time, we continue 
to condemn the act because the defendant has 
claimed a right to use violence that is not his own. 
Nourse, 106 Yale L.J. 1331, 1393. This "warranted excuse" 
approach would mitigate the culpability, for example, of a man 
who murders his daughter's rapist, but not one who murders his 
departing girlfriend. See id. at 1392. 
<JI42 But this is not the law in Utah. And here, at least some 
members of a properly instructed jury seemed to struggle with 
whether, on these facts, Scott was entitled to special mitigation. 
In this circumstance, under present law, I cannot say that my 
confidence in the verdict is not undermined. But like Judge 
Christiansen, I urge our legislature to revise section 76-5-205.5 so 
that it can no longer be used to mitigate the final act of abuse 
perpetrated by an abusive intimate partner. 
CHRISTIANSEN, Judge (concurring): 
<JI43 I agree with the majority opinion's conclusion that 
defense counsel's performance at trial was deficient when he 
failed to argue that the alleged "threat" made to Scott by Teresa 
was non-hearsay. As explained by the majority, supra <JI 22, 
Teresa's alleged threat to Scott was not a statement offered for its 
truth and thus fell outside of the definition of hearsay. See Utah 
R. Evid. 801(c); United States v. Stratton, 779 F.2d 820, 830 (2d Cir. 
1985). Competent defense counsel should have known enough to 
correctly argue that the rules of evidence would allow the jury to 
hear this testimony. And, while I do not believe that hearing the 
specifics of the alleged threat would ultimately have made a 
difference in the jury's verdict, I recognize that it is "not within 
the province of an appellate court to substitute its judgment for 
20140995-CA 15 2017 UT App 74 
State v. Scott 
that of a front line fact-finder." In re Z.D., 2006 UT 54, <JI 24, 147 
P.3d 401. Therefore, I agree that remand is warranted. 
<J{44 However, though I agree with the majority opinion, I 
write separately to voice my concern regarding the current 
statutory implementation of the extreme emotional distress 
(EED) defense. I do not believe the EED defense should have 
been available to Scott. After Scott had abused and threatened 
her over the course of several years, he shot an unarmed Teresa 
three times, including once in the mouth, while she was lying on 
their bed with her cell phone in her hand. In my view, this 
"reaction" to the marital difficulties combined with an alleged 
threat by Teresa does not create a situation in which Scott should 
be able to claim he was exposed "to extreme emotional distress" 
that would reasonably explain and mitigate his loss of self-
control. Though our courts have employed a generous approach 
to the EED defense, see, e.g., State v. White, 2011 UT 21, <JI 29, 251 
P.3d 820, we must still consider the circumstances surrounding a 
defendant's purported EED from the viewpoint of a reasonable 
person. "Thus, the legal standard is whether the circumstances 
were such that the average reasonable person would react by 
experiencing a loss of self-control." Id. <JI 36 (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
<J{45 I do not agree with Scott's assertion that a difficult and 
contentious marriage, combined with Teresa's alleged threat, 
could have resulted in the type of extremely unusual and 
overwhelming stress that would cause "the average reasonable 
person" to experience "a loss of self-control." See id. (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted). Allowing the defendant to 
claim special mitigation under facts such as these undercuts and 
de-legitimizes the proper purpose of the battered-spouse aspect 
of the EED defense. 
<J{46 Indeed, the availability of the EED defense to persons in 
Scott's situation highlights the defense's problematic history. As 
this court has recently stated, and as noted in Judge Voros's 
concurring opinion, "What is generally known as the 
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provocation defense has for two decades been criticized as 
mitigating violence committed by men against women in 
intimate relationships. It now is one of the most controversial 
doctrines in the criminal law because of its perceived gender 
bias[.]" State v. Sanchez, 2016 UT App 189, <JI 40 n.9, 380 P.3d 375 
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted) (collecting 
authorities), cert. granted, 390 P.3d 719 (Utah 2017) and 390 P.3d 
727 (Utah 2017); see also, e.g., James J. Sing, Culture as Sameness: 
Toward a Synthetic View of Provocation and Culture in the Criminal 
Law, 108 Yale L.J. 1845, 1865 (1999) (noting that the "provocation 
doctrine has its historical roots in a value system that embraced 
the oppression of women"). It is true that EED defense 
jurisprudence has come a long way since the old common law 
provocation/heat of passion defense. See, e.g., State v. Bishop, 753 
P.2d 439, 468-70 (Utah 1988) (plurality opinion) (discussing the 
evolution of the EED defense in Utah), overruled on other grounds 
as recognized by Ross v. State, 2012 UT 93, 293 P.3d 345. But, as 
applied here, the EED defense allows an abusive defendant such 
as Scott (who had committed domestic violence against Teresa 
and who had at one time been the subject of a restraining order) 
to claim that the cumulative emotional stress of a difficult 
marriage and a single alleged threat mitigated his otherwise 
unprovoked murder of his wife. By doing so, the current 
statutory implementation of the EED defense gives continued 
life to antiquated notions of spousal control and perpetuates a 
belief that violence against women and intimate-partner 
homicide are acceptable and legitimate. The law should not do 
so. I therefore urge our legislature to review Utah Code section 
76-5-205.5, and to consider explicit recognition in the statute that 
an abusive spouse or partner cannot claim special mitigation 
under these types of circumstances. 
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D – R.180: Trial Court’s Supplemental Instruction (Dynamite Instruction) 
SUPPLEMENTAL INSTRUCTION 
Members of the jury, I am going to ask you to continue your deliberations in an effort to 
agree upon a verdict. I am specifically asking you to review all of the jury instructions I have 
previously given you. 
This trial represents a significant expenditure of time and effort by you, the court, the 
parties, and their attorneys. If you should fail to agree upon a verdict, the case is left open and 
may have to be tried again, and there is no reason to believe that the case can be tried again by 
either side better or more exhaustively than it has been tried to you. 
In order to bring eight minds to a unanimous result jurors should examine with candor the 
questions submitted to them, with due regard and deference to the opinions of each other. All 
jurors should consider whether their position is a reasonable one, when it makes no impression 
on the minds of another equally honest, equally intelligent juror, who has heard the same 
evidence, with an equal desire to arrive at the truth, under the sanction of the same oath. 
Nevertheless, as I previously instructed you, it is your duty as jurors to consult with one 
another and to deliberate, with a view to reaching an agreement, if you can do so without 
violence to your individual judgment. You each must decide the case for yourself, but should do 
so only after a consideration of the case with your fellow jurors. You should not hesitate to 
change an opinion if convinced that it is erroneous. However, you should not surrender your 
honest convictions concerning the effect or weight of evidence for the mere purpose of returning 
a verdict or solely because of the opinion of the other jurors. 
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